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other violators within a specified time 9 or on the continuation of an ef-
fective enforcement program." The retailer discriminated against might
also be able to secure affirmative relief on the theory that non-discrimina-
tion is a "service" within the meaning of section 2 (e) of the Robinson-
Patman Act." Under this theory the retailer might obtain injunctive
relief or treble damages.92 Similarly, there is no reason why the courts
might not give the contracting retailer discriminated against specific re-
lief against a discriminating manufacturer by means of a constructive
condition, since it would undoubtedly appear that adequate enforcement
is implicit in the fair trade contract. 93
PART IV: INDIRECT METHODS OF EVADING THE
FAIR TRADE LAWS
COMBINATION SALES
Where a combination is composed entirely of fair traded items and is
itself fair traded at a price equal to or in excess of the sum of the fair
trade prices of the components there is no violation of the fair trade laws.'
However, in combinations consisting of both fair trade items and non-fair
trade items the price at which the combination is itself fair traded is of
primary concern. In Frank Fischer Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug
Co.,2 one of the combinations put out by plaintiff, which the defendant
alleged constituted an abandonment of price structure, included a fair
trade product plus a non-fair trade product at a price of one cent in excess
of the price of the fair trade product. The New Jersey court, in striking
89. Fishman v. Kaye, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1950 Trade Cas.) 1 62718 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1950).
90. General EIec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct.),
rev'd and judgment vacated on plaintiff-respondent's motion, 278 App. Div. 939, 105
N.Y.S.2d (1st Dep't 1951).
91. Note, 65 Yale L.J. 235, 243-44 (1955).
92. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26 (1951).
93. See 3 Corbin, Contracts §§ 632, 653 (1951); 3 Williston, Contracts §§ 668, 675A
(rev. ed. 1936).
1. It has been held that the combination may itself be a commodity fair traded by the
producer. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Siegel, 1 A.D.2d 1002, 151 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1st Dep't 1956).
Accord, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Home Util. Co., 234 F.2d 766 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
granted, 352 U.S. 821, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 956 (1957).
Generally it is the manufacturer who puts out the combination, the question of its
validity being raised as a matter of defense to the effect that the producer has abandoned
his price structure as to the fair trade items in the combination. When the retailer or
wholesaler is the party putting out the combination, the question is whether he is selling
the fair trade items in the combination below their fair trade prices.
2. 129 N.J. Eq. 105, 19 A.2d 454 (Ch. 1941).
down the combination sale, said, "... in every case [including the com-
bination now being considered] the price of the combination package
reduces the value of the individual unit for which a minimum resale price
had previously been established. The manufacturer is attempting to en-
force at the same time its two price schedules for the combination and the
individual article . . . .This court held that the act of the manufacturer
resulted in an abandonment of the minimum resale price which had been
fixed for the articles which were a part of the combination." 3
However, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Siegel,4 the producer of the com-
bination was granted relief. The New York Supreme Court rejected de-
fendant's contention that the combination constituted an abandonment by
plaintiff of its price structure and denied the injunction solely upon the
ground that the combination as it stood could not be properly fair traded.
The appellate division, in a memorandum opinion, reversed this holding
and granted the injunction on the ground that the combination was in itself
a commodity and could be fair traded. 5 The combination in the Eastman
case consisted of fair trade items made by plaintiff and non-fair trade
items, some of which were made by other producers. The sum of the
price of the fair trade items was $7.85, the fair trade price of the combina-
tion was $13.65, with the difference of $5.80 presumably representing
the price of the non-fair trade items. Perhaps significantly, neither New
York court discussed the question of abandonment in terms of the relation
of the combination price to the price of the fair trade items included, as
did the New Jersey court in the Fischer case.0
The factual distinction between the Fischer case and the Eastman case
lends support to the proposition that the respective courts were in reality
applying the same rule and that the difference in result arose because of
the difference in facts. There is little doubt that the one cent price of the
non-fair trade item in the Fischer case was used as a makeweight to dis-
guise what, in its practical effect, was a reduction in the price of the fair
trade item. But this inference could not be so easily drawn with respect
to the $5.80 price of the non-fair trade items in the Eastman combination.
Thus, on the surface at least, it is possible to argue that New Jersey and
New York apply the same rule of thumb to combination sales based upon
the peculiar facts of each case. In opposition to such a conclusion, how-
ever, stands the dictum of the court in the Eastman case, "... combina-
tion sales of identical or different fair traded products of the same man-
3. Id. at 112, 19 A.2d at 459. (Emphasis added.)
4. 2 Misc. 2d 966, 150 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 1 A.D.2d 1002, 151 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1st Dep't 1956).
5. 1 A.D.2d 1002, 151 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1st Dep't 1956). Accord, Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Home Util. Co., 234 F.2d 766 (4th Cir. 1956).
6. See note 3 supra.
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ufacturer at less than the sum of the fair trade prices fixed for each in-
dividual item should be protectable under the Fair Trade Law .... M
This, it should be noted, is an even more extreme situation than that
presented in the Fischer case. There is strong probability, therefore, that
the respective rationales of the Fischer and Eastman cases are, in fact,
opposed to one another. If such is the fact, the more equitable view is
that taken by New Jersey since it places the burden of the confusion, if
any, which a combination may cause on the retail market upon the party
causing it."
Combinations consisting of two or more fair trade items where the
combination price is less than the sum of the fair trade prices of the com-
ponents have also been held to be an abandonment by the producer of
its price structure. In Bathasweet Corp. v. Weissbard9 two of the com-
binations in question involved fair trade items sold in combination at a
price less than the sum of their prices when sold separately. The New
Jersey court said: "when the complainant placed upon the market a
combination package for resale at a price which was less than the ag-
gregate price of the combined items when sold independent of the combi-
nation, it abandoned its fair trade contract and the prices fixed thereunder
on the individual items." 10 Tennessee has rejected this position" and
the dictum in the Eastman case indicates that New York may also adopt
a contrary view.'2 Again it appears that the New Jersey position is the
sounder from an equitable point of view. The fair trade laws, at least
ostensibly, were passed to enable the producer, or other parties who may
suffer damage, to protect his interest in the good will attached to the trade
name or brand by stipulating minimum resale prices for such commodities
and enforcing them against sellers by injunctive proceedings. 3 In permit-
7. 2 Misc. 2d at 979, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (dictum). (Emphasis added.)
8. Bathasweet Corp. v. Weissbard, 128 N.J. Eq. 135, 15 A.2d 337 (Ch. 1940). The dif-
ficulties of the retailer stocked with the individual fair trade item who must sell it at its
fair trade price in competition with the combination was noted by a New York court but
did not enter its decision. Pinaud, Inc. v. Beaux Arts Chemists Corp., 170 Misc. 583, 10
N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
9. 128 N.J. Eq. 135, 15 A.2d 337 (Ch. 1940).
10. Id. at 138, 15 A.2d at 339. Utah may have adopted this position in regard to such
combinations. Opinion of the Attorney General of Utah, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1941
Trade Cas.) ff 56162 (Utah 1941).
11. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Hogue & Knott Super Market, CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(1955 Trade Cas.) ff 67989 (W.D. Tenn. 1955). Plaintiff producer fair traded 34 oz. of
toothpaste at $.47 then put out a combination of two tubes of the same toothpaste equalling
3V oz. for a combination price of $.39. The court held that there was no abandonment,
such short term offers being a legitimate and common practice among producers such as
plaintiff.
12. See note 7 supra.
13. Bristol-Myers Co. v. L. Bamberger & Co., 122 NJ. Eq. 559, 195 Atl. 625 (Ch.
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ting equitable enforcement by the producer the courts should take care
to see that the producer satisfies the equitable maxim that "he who seeks
the aid of equity should himself do equity." To permit a producer to set
up a low priced combination of fair trade items in competition with retailers
who bought the items individually relying upon the producer to aid in
their sale, not obstruct it, is inconsistent with the equitable nature of the
action.' 4
EMPLOYEE DISCOUNTS' 5
Certain classes of purchasers, generally charitable or municipal organ-
izations, are specifically exempted from fair trade price provisions by the
statutes.'6 The producer, however, may expressly exempt certain pur-
chasers by the terms of his fair trade contract. Generally, such exclusions
run only in favor of the producer's own employees and/or the employees
1937); Guerlain, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 297 N.Y. 11, 74 N.E.2d 217, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 837 (1947). This is generally held to be the basic purpose of all of the fair
trade laws.
14. There are other types of combinations which raise problems somewhat beyond the
scope of the discussion in this section. Combinations consisting of a fair trade item and
a free gift fall more properly within the discussion of gifts in conjunction with the sale
of fair trade items, p. 100 infra. Combinations consisting of fair trade items made by
the combining producer and fair trade items made by another producer raise an anti-
trust problem. In Magazine Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbard, 125 N.J. Eq. 593, 7 A.2d
411 (Ch. 1939), the New Jersey court held that the plaintiff, by permitting a fellow producer
to sell its fair traded razor in combination with his own shaving cream for a combination
price less than the fair trade price of the razor, abandoned its price structure as to the
razor. The court noted that resale price fixing agreements between the producers would be
illegal. Possible solutions for plaintiff in such a case might be a refusal to sell to the
combining producer, or the courts might possibly consider the combining producer in such
a case as a seller and permit plaintiff to enforce its fair trade prices against him under the
fair trade law.
15. Discounts directly effecting a reduction in the minimum resale price of a fair trade
item, would, in the absence of exemptions either statutory or contractual, constitute a
violation of the fair trade law. Discounts such as those involved in the giving of trading
stamps, cash register receipts and similar devices will be discussed pp. 100-03 infra.
Discounts such as the familiar quantity purchase discounts between wholesalers or between
wholesalers and retailers may or may not be violations of the fair trade laws depending
upon whether the producer by his fair trade contract has established minimum resale prices
at all levels of the merchandising 'chain or has only fixed the minimum resale price at the
retail level. Of course, even where there is a stipulated minimum, the discount may be given
by varying the margin in excess of the minimum price. Since the primary concern is the
price at which the ultimate consumer can get-the item, it is the general practice of producers
to fix only the retail price leaving the middlemen free to grant such discounts among them-
selves as are deemed useful to their business.
16. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369a (3). Obviously sales to employees of such
exempted charitable or municipal organizations would not fall within the words or intent
of the statutory exemptions unless the employees were purchasing as agents of the corporation
for the use and benefit of the corporation.
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of the producer's distributors although they may sometimes include the
employees of retailers handling the producer's products. The right of the
producer to make such express exemptions if they are reasonable and no
discrimination is made among sellers who may make sales to such ex-
empted persons, has generally been upheld." The reasonableness of the
exception, of course, would depend upon its extent and the circumstances
involved. A seller who sells fair trade products to his own employees at
discounts where such employees are not expressly exempted in the fair
trade contract, violates the fair trade law. 8 It follows, therefore, that the
common practice of small retailers in industrial communities of granting
discounts below minimum resale price to employees of the larger firms
in the area may in many cases constitute a violation of the fair trade law.
GIFTS, TRADING STAMPS, CASH REGISTER RECEIPTS AND
CUSTOMER SERVICES
The giving of a free gift in conjunction with the sale of a fair trade
commodity, except to the extent authorized by the fair trade contract,
is specifically prohibited by the statutes of nineteen states. 19 Decisions
in New York and New Jersey, the statutes of which do not contain such
specific prohibitions, have reached substantially the same result.20
The question of whether the familiar trading stamps, cash register
receipts and similar devices given with the purchase of commodities and
redeemable in cash or merchandise, constitute a violation of the fair trade
laws has occasioned a split among the jurisdictions. The statutes of
twenty of the states specifically prohibit the offering or making of any
concession of any kind in conjunction with the sale of fair trade com-
modities except to the extent authorized by the fair trade contracts. -' In
17. General Elec. Co. v. Federal Employees' Distributing Co., 45 Cal. 2d 914, 291 P.2d
942 (1956); Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn.
596, 24 A.2d 841 (1942) ; Schill v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 179 Md. 83, 17 A.2d 175
(1941); General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956);
Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Weissbard, 129 N.J. Eq. 563, 20 A.2d 445 (Ch. 1941); General
Elec. Co. v. Klein on the Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1953); see also,
General Elec. Co. v. Monarch-Saphin Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
18. Bristol-Myers Co. v. L. Bamberger & Co., 122 N.J. Eq. 559, 195 At. 625 (Ch. 1937).
19. 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) 11 3008 (1956).
20. E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Charline's Cut Rate, Inc., 9 N.J. Super. 328, 74 A.2d 354
(Ch. 1950); Bernhard v. Savall Drug Store, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1948). The
latter case made an interesting distinction. Defendant therein was enjoined from offering
a free gift with every purchase of $2.00 or more. Defendant amended the offer to a free
gift for every person entering the store regardless of whether a purchase was made or not.
An injunction was denied on the ground that the offer now was merely a device to attract
customers and was not directly related to the sale of the commodities in the store.
21. 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) 11 3008 (1956). Wisconsin has a separate statute
prohibiting the giving of stamps when the result would be a sale below the fair trade price.
1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. supra.
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these states there are few problems in regard to stamps and similar de-
vices.22
The decisions in those states in which there are no express statutory
prohibitions, fall into two general classes.
First, those jurisdictions which hold that such devices are merely dis-
counts given in consideration for the payment of cash and do not effect a
direct reduction in the price of the commodities involved.23
Second, those jurisdictions which hold that such devices do directly
effect a reduction in price of the commodities involved and, when offered
in conjunction with the sale of fair trade commodities, constitute a viola-
22. There is a possible state constitutional problem involved. There are cases in some
of the states which involved statutes prohibiting the giving of premiums in conjunction
with the sale of certain commodities. Many of these statutes were held to be unconstitu-
tional as violative of the due process clause of the state constitution. Stamps were the
premiums involved in some of them, e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass.
408, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940). Generally the objection was made that the trading stamp
business was a legitimate business practice which was protected under due process and the
prohibition of such practice in the particular cases had no reasonable relation to the police
power of the states. New York had such a case, People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 17 N.E.
343 (1888), and it was cited on the constitutional problem in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker,
302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950). The court of appeals distinguished People v. Gillson
on the ground that whereas the direct prohibition of the trading stamp business as such
might be a violation of due process, the regulation of that business to give effect to fair
trade legislation which had been held to be within the police power would not be un-
constitutional. This position might be taken regardless of whether the particular fair trade
statute involved expressly prohibits trading stamps in conjunction with the sale of fair trade
commodities or whether such a prohibition is implied by the courts. The Supreme Judical
Court of Massachusetts in the recent case of Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods
Co., - Mass. -, 148 N.E.2d 861 (1958), cited Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, supra,
with approval saying that while "... . this court has stated in several cases that the issuance of
trading stamps is a legitimate practice which could not be made unlawful by legislative enact-
ment .... [Luike all rights, this right cannot be exercised in such a way as to injure the
rights of others [the producer's right to protect his good will]." - Mass. at - , 148
N.E.2d at 866.
It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court in Rast v. Van Deman &
Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 343 (1916), held that a state in the exercise of its police power could
prohibit the giving of premiums with the purchase of certain merchandise without violating
the federal due process clause.
23. Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131
P.2d 856 (1952); Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, - Okla. -, 322
P.2d 179 (1958); Gever v. American Stores Co., 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956). There
is a New Jersey decision, Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310
(1954), decided not under the state fair trade act but under the Motor Fuels Sales Act. The
court specifically stated that it was not concerned with the conventional price fixing act
but it held that stamps were merely a cash discount; a term of payment and not a price
reduction. In the light of such reasoning it is difficult to see how a different result could be
reached in regard to stamps and the sale of fair trade commodities.
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tion of the fair trade law.24 The New York Court of Appeals in Bristol-
Myers Co. v. Picker 5 considered the question in the following terms:
"considered as a method of advertising, the challenged scheme [cash reg-
ister receipts] must be differentiated from types of service such as free
parking, self-service, care of infants, entertainment, free delivery and the
like . . .. These other types of service have no direct relation to the arti-
cle purchased or the price paid .... Here the benefit to the customer
is directly, proportionately, inseparably and specifically related to the
article purchased and its price." 26 It is submitted that this is a fairly
good test whereby all types of "devices" on the retail level presently in
use or which may be used in the future may be judged in relation to viola-
tion of the fair trade law.
It is urged by those jurisdictions which consider such devices to be
mere cash discounts that the giving of stamps had been a legitimate mer-
chandising device long before the passage of the fair trade acts and that
it was not the intent of the legislature in those acts to prohibit this prac-
tice. This argument finds support only in those jurisdictions the statutes
of which do not expressly prohibit concessions such as stamps and similar
devices.Y
The stamps which the purchaser of a fair trade item at the stipulated
fair trade price receives are not valueless; they represent a value in con-
nection with the exchange which cannot logically be ignored when de-
24. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co., - Mass. - , 148 N.E.2d 861
(1958) (stamps and cash register receipts); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61,
96 N.E.2d 177 (1950) (cash register receipts); Ed. Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41,
295 N.W. 737 (1941) (stamps). The Wisconsin fair trade laws specifically prohibit stamps
where the result is a sale below fair trade price and that was the ground of the decision.
See note 21 supra. The court stated, however, that it does not necessarily follow that
because a device is a cash discount it does not effect a reduction in price as well. The
Massachusetts court in Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co. supra said, "there
is no magic in the words 'cash discount.' When subjected to analysis they are merely a
euphemism for what is in reality a price cut." - Mass. at -, 148 N.E.2d at 865.
25. 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950). It is interesting to note in connection with the
constitutional problem outlined, note 22 supra, that both the Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm
Farm Foods Co. and the Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes cases, note 24 supra, lend support to
the New York position that while prohibition of stamps may be unconstitutional, regula-
tion to give effect to the fair trade laws would not.
26. Id. at 68, 96 N.E.2d at 180. The courts appear to be in general accord that cus-
tomer services such as those mentioned by the New York court do not constitute violations
of the fair trade laws but are legitimate competitive methods to attract customers. Accord,
Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 P.2d 856
(1943); Gever v. American Co., 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956).
27. This was one of the arguments put forth by the courts in Weco Products Co. v.
Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, and Gever v. American Stores Co., note 23 supra. Neither
the California nor the Pennsylvania fair trade statutes expressely refer to the giving of
stamps or other concessions. See note 21 supra.
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termining the actual price paid for the item. The price of an article
necessarily includes the entire exchange of value between buyer and seller
in relation to the article.
The weakness of the cash discount theory is further demonstrated by
the holding of the California court in Food and Grocery Bureau, Inc. v.
Garfield.8 It was held in that case that the fact that a seller did an
all cash business did not prevent him from giving stamps in consideration
of the payment of cash for his goods. It is a somewhat strained position
to say that such a retailer is giving a cash discount. At best, the discount
is being given in consideration for the willingness of customers to patron-
ize a store where they cannot get credit.
If, as seems clear, stamps and similar devices effect a reduction in price
of the commodity below fair trade price, which need not be the case where
the products are being sold for a price in excess of the stipulated mini-
mum, they constitute a violation of the fair trade laws regardless of the
reason for which they are given.
REPACKAGING
There is no question that where a seller removes the label or other
indicia of the producer's good will in the fair trade commodity and re-
sells it wholly without the use in any way of that good will, he may resell
it at his own price. 9
Where, however, the seller sells the producer's product in a new pack-
age but one which bears indicia of the producer's good will, if the result
is a sale below the fair trade price, there is a violation of the fair trade
law. An interesting question as to what constitutes a sale below fair trade
price in such a case was presented in Guerlain, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth
Co.30 There the court said of defendants' attempt to sell perfume in
smaller quantities in its own bottles but still under a plaintiff's name, "in
employing [plaintiff's brand] . . . , in placing [it] on the label, defendants
are using plaintiff's good will ... to facilitate sales. They are ...in
28. 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942).
29. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936);
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 221 F.2d 326 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 839 (1955); Guerlain, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 297 N.Y. 11,
74 N.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947); Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 121
NJ. Eq. 585, 191 At. 873 (Ch. 1937); Lentheric, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 338 Pa.
523, 13 A.2d 12 (1940). The statutes of Ala., Ark., Colo., Conn., Del., Ga., Idaho, Ind.,
Kan., Mont., Neb., N.C., S.D., Utah, W. Va., and Wyo. specifically exempt sales where the
label has been removed or obliterated and the sale is made without the use of the producer's
good will. 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) ff 3006 (1956).
30. 297 N.Y. 11, 74 N.E.2d 217 (1947). For a fuller discussion of the facts of this case
and the holding in regard to what constitutes a sale below fair trade price see Part H:
Definitions and Related Problems, p. 80 supra.
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practical effect, identifying the product as plaintiff's, and to that extent
they are violating the plain mandate of the Feld-Crawford Act." 3'
Pinesbridge Farm, Inc. v. Bloomingdale Bros., Inc.' raised a some-
what different problem. The producer fair traded the product under one
name but put out the same product (smoked turkey pate) under a dif-
ferent brand name without regard to price restrictions. The court re-
jected defendant's contention that this constituted an abandonment by
plaintiff of its price schedule, substantially on the ground that the pro-
ducer, like the vendor, may separate the physical property from the
indicia of good will and sell the product under other brands without re-
gard to fair trade prices.
DAMAGE AND CLOSE-OUT SALES
While damage and close-out sales are specifically exempted by the fair
trade statutes of all jurisdictions, the requirements vary. 3 The problems
involved mainly concern questions of fact as to good faith, actual damage
and the like.
Concerning damage sales, in New York at least, the goods must actually
be damaged and notice must be given to the public that the reduction in
price is due to the fact that the goods are damaged and the allowance
made must be reasonably proportionate to the extent of the damage.34
In order for a seller to sell damaged goods below list price, it is not neces-
sary that the goods be damaged while owned by him. 5
The statutes of some of the states exempt sales of second hand as well
as damaged articles,36 while those of New York and some other jurisdic-
tions do not. The enactments of the latter group do not expressly state
whether in speaking of fair trade commodities they refer only to new
commodities. If second hand fair trade commodities also come within
31. Id. at 18-19, 74 N.E.2d at 219. The Feld-Crawford Act referred to is the New York
fair trade act.
32. 176 Misc. 179, 26 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
33. 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) 1111 3005-06 (1956).
34. Empire State Camera Exchange, Inc. v. Reynolds, 194 Misc. 301, 88 N.Y.S.2d 107
(Sup. Ct. 1949). The provisions of the New York act in regard to damage sales are as
follows: (Sales are Exempted) "When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, and
notice is given to the public thereof." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369a(2)(b). The court
interpreted this as follows, "if and when a particular article becomes actually damaged
. . . it may . . .be sold at less than list price, provided the fact of damage . . . and the
fact that it is being sold below list price because of such damage ... are made known to the
customer, and provided the discount below list price is fairly proportioned to the nature
and extent of the damage . . . 2" Empire State Camera Exchange, Inc. v. Reynolds, supra at
303-04, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 109-10.
35. Remington Arms, Inc. v. Fox & Murphy, Inc., 206 Misc. 1030, 136 N.Y.S.2d 272
(Sup. Ct. 1954). That this is not so in the case of close-out sales, see notes 40 and 42 infra.
36. 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) 11 3006 (1956).
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the prohibitions of the statute, then a problem is clearly presented for,
very often, such articles may not qualify as damaged goods. Thus, if the
statute requires second hand dealers to sell fair trade commodities at
fair trade price, such dealers would be faced with the reluctance of pur-
chasers to pay the same price for a used article as they would for a new
article. It would seem, therefore, that statutes not containing an express
exemption for the sale of second hand fair trade commodities, would be
construed as containing an implied exemption to that effect or as relating
only to new articles. There do not appear to be any cases on this point.
With regard to close-out sales the sale must be made by the owner of
the goods for the purpose of discontinuing delivery of that type of mer-
chandise.37 In Remington Arms, Inc. v. Harris Berger, Inc." defendant
purchased plaintiff's shells from a dealer who was closing out the item and
resold them below fair trade price. The court granted the injunction on
the ground that the sales by defendant were not sales by the "owner"
within the meaning of the fair trade act and were not made for the pur-
pose of discontinuing delivery of the item by defendant. In the California
case of Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Benatar9 the defendant purchased war
surplus toothpowder from the federal government, the brand being clearly
stated on the packages. He put this toothpowder on sale below the fair
trade price of the same brand toothpowder which he regularly carried.
The court took the same position as the New York court saying, "it
seems very doubtful whether a merchant who.., bought large quantities
of a war surplus commodity for the express purpose of selling them below
fair trade price, can be said to be 'closing out the owner's stock' even if
he does not intend to further carry the same commodity."40
In Bulova Watch Co. v. Sattler's, Inc.4 1 an attempt was made to avoid
this problem. Here defendant made an agreement to purchase all the
stock of a dealer who was going out of business which stock included
plaintiff's fair trade products. The agreement provided that the "close-
out" sale would take place in a department set aside in defendant's store
and defendant was to have complete control of the sale and advertising,
although the dealer was to retain title to the stock during the sale. The
court in granting the injunction said, "... such practice . . . should not
37. The New York statute, which is typical, provides in part: (Sales are Exempted)
"In closing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing delivering of such
commodity." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369a 2(a).
38. 208 Misc. 561, 144 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
39. 99 Cal. App. 2d 393, 221 P.2d 965 (1950). Accord, National Distillers Products
Corp. v. Greenwald Liquors, Inc., I CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed. 1956) § 3222.05 (D.C.
Colo. 1939); Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Helstrom, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1952 Trade
Cas.) ff 67366 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1952).
40. 99 Cal. App. 2d at398, 221 P.2d at 969.
41. 208 Misc. 257, 143 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
1958]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
be permitted to be used as a device to allow the store management to evade
responsibility for compliance with the [fair trade laws] .... ,, 42 The
court further held that defendant, having full control, had full responsi-
bility to any persons who might be injured by the trade practices used.
TRADE-INs
There is a paucity of authority on the question of trade-ins. Apparently,
an allowance on the list price of a fair trade commodity where that al-
lowance represents a reasonable price for the trade-in of an old commodity
which the seller has at least seen, and of which he makes a reasonable ef-
fort to secure possession, is not a violation of the fair trade law.43 In
General Elec. Co. v. Wite Elec. Appliances Co.,4 4 an allowance of $1.00
for an old electric iron made to a stranger without seeing the iron and
without attempting to acquire possession of it was stated to be incredible
as a matter of law.
If used in good faith, a trade-in is merely a method of simplifying the
exchange between the parties. Basically it is the good faith of the seller
with regard to the trade-in item which should determine whether a par-
ticular trade-in allowance is or is not utilized as a device to evade the fair
trade law.
CONSUMER CO-OPERATIVES
The problem involved here is whether or not the so-called "patronage
dividend" is a discount on the price of commodities purchased by the
members from the co-operative or is a distribution of the net profits of
the joint venture in proportion to the patronage of the members. In Sun-
beam Corp. v. Civil Serv., Employees' Co-operative Ass'n 45 the point
was not directly in issue although the court indicated throughout that it
would not consider the patronage dividend a violation of the fair trade
law. In that case, unlike the usual consumer co-operative, defendant al-
lowed a discount directly upon purchase of the commodities by the pur-
chaser. The court said, "we do not have before us the question whether
a year-end distribution of profits to members can constitute a violation
of the Fair Trade Acts. We do have the question of whether a discount
at the time of sale is a violation. We conclude that it is. .... 46
There is a definite distinction between the "patronage dividend" and
42. Id. at 260, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
43. Sunbeam Corp. v. Baumgarten, 93 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
44. CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1950 Trade Cas.) 11 62637 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
45. 187 F.2d 768 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 192 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952). The reversal was on another ground, namely that defendant
was a nonsigner and plaintiff could not enforce the contracts. This ground is no longer
applicable since the passage of the McGuire Act.
46. Id. at 772.
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the direct price discount.47 It is suggested that the "patronage dividend,"
if it is to be considered as related to the sale and price of commodities at
all, falls within the category of those devices which are not directly re-
lated to the article purchased and its price"
MAIL ORDER SALES
Mail order sales constitute by far the most urgent problem in fair trade
litigation. It is not an unwarranted generalization to say that the future
of fair trade legislation as it exists today is inextricably entwined with the
legal implications of mail order sales.
There is no doubt that resales or advertising and offering incidental to
contemplated resales within a fair trade jurisdiction below the fair trade
price constitute actionable wrongs under the statutes of that jurisdiction.4 9
The difficulty arises where there is no resale or contemplated resale within
a fair trade jurisdiction but there is open and systematic advertising and
offering done within that jurisdiction in relation to sales to be technically
made within a free trade jurisdiction where sales below list price would be
legal. ° Since there is no federal fair trade law51 a plaintiff seeking to
enjoin the activities of a particular seller must prove a cause of action
under the fair trade statute of some particular state or territory.
The issue in such cases is, whether in and of itself such advertising and
offering below fair trade price done in a fair trade jurisdiction constitutes
an actionable wrong under the fair trade statute of the jurisdiction. Many
of the fair trade statutes provide in part that wilfully and knowingly
advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the
price stipulated is unfair competition which may be enjoined by injured
parties. 2 Many of these provisions are taken in laec verba from the
47. Bunn, Consumers' Co-operatives and Price Fixing Laws, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 165, 173
(1941).
48. See the "test" used by the court in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, note 26 supra.
49. General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 824 (1957); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 240 F.2d
684 (4th Cir. 1957).
50. There are at present a total of nine jurisdictions which have either never passed a
fair trade statute or have declared their statutes unconstitutional. 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(10th ed.) f1 10000 (1956). These are the so-called "free trade" jurisdictions in which
resale price fixing agreements would be illegal as violative of the antitrust laws.
51. The Miller Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1953), and the McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 45 (Supp. 1957), are merely enabling or permissive legislation which exempt resale price
fixing agreements from the federal antitrust and interstate commerce laws where such
agreements were entered into in jurisdictions wherein they are legal in intrastate commerce.
Thus fair trade violations are strictly a cause of action under state law and, when brought
in federal courts on grounds of diversity, those courts must apply applicable state law.
52. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 369b. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Masters, Inc., 7
Misc. 2d 185, 153 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1956), the New York Supreme Court clearly and
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McGuire Act itself.5 3 These provisions are framed in the disjunctive in-
dicating an intent that each of these acts, in and of itself, is a sufficient
basis for a cause of action established under state law and permitted by
the McGuire Act. Why, then, have two circuit courts of appeal refused
injunctions where there was clearly advertising and offering below fair
trade price being done within a fair trade jurisdiction?54 It was reasoned
that the price fixing agreement would be illegal and, therefore, unenforce-
able in any respect were it not for the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts;
that those acts, however, did not exempt the enforcement of all price fixing
agreements in all respects and in all situations but only those agreements
which are lawful ". . . in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia
in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be
transported for such resale." 11 The term "resale" has a technical meaning
in the law of sales, referring to the passage of title from seller to buyer.
The place of resale, therefore, would be the geographical situs at which
title passes from seller to buyer. If the provisions of any price fixing
agreement are to be enforced against such resale the McGuire Act states
that it must be an agreement lawful under a "statute, law, or public pol-
icy" of that place, i.e., the "place where such resale is to be made." When
the McGuire Act sets forth advertising, offering to sell or selling below
stipulated price as actionable unfair competition, it must be interpreted
in the light of that section of the act which makes the place of resale the
determining factor as to any enforcement under a price fixing agree-
ment.56 Thus in order to have a basis for a cause of action for advertising
or offering or selling there must be an agreement enforceable at the place
where the sales are made or the place where the sales contemplated by the
advertising and offering are to be made.
In both General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co.,5 7 and Bissell
Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co.,"5 the defendant was the
same mail order house located in Washington, D. C., a free trade jurisdic-
unmistakably construed this section in the disjunctive holding that advertising and offers
below price in and of themselves violate the fair trade law regardless of the place of resale.
53. The McGuire Act provides in part: "(3) Nothing contained in this section or in any
of the Antitrust Acts shall render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or
right of action created by any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, which in substance provides that willfully
and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling . . . is unfair competition and is
actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby." 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (3) (Supp. 1957).
54. General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 824 (1957) ; Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 240 F.2d 684
(4th Cir. 1957).
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (2) (Supp. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
56. See notes 53-55 supra.
57. 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957).
58. 240 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1957).
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tion. By the technical law of sales, title in all of the defendant's mail
order sales passed to the customer within Washington, D. C. The defend-
ant advertised and made offers in relation to these sales in fair trade ju-
risdictions. These advertising operations of defendant were particularly
pronounced in the General Elec. Co. case. In both cases the plaintiffs
substantially prayed for an injunction restraining the advertising and of-
fering being done by the defendant including in the General Elec. Co.
complaint the sales themselves. In respect to the sales themselves it was
urged that while technically the sales were consummated in the District
of Columbia, the economic impact was found in New York where the
bulk of the customers resided and, therefore, for all practical purposes, they
constituted sales in New York in violation of the New York fair trade law.
This contention was the basis upon which the district court granted the
injunction but it was rejected by the circuit court in reversing that de-
cision. 9 In respect to the advertising and offering done within the fair
trade jurisdiction in relation to the sales to be made in the District of
Columbia, the court in the Bissell case said, "we agree . . . that advertis-
ing the sale of a commodity at less than the stipulated fair price is of it-
self unfair competition .. . whether or not a sale takes place; but we are
satisfied that the advertisement must relate to a sale of goods within the
State in order to fall within the condemnation of the statute." 10 Chief
Justice Clark in the General Elec. Co. case set forth substantially the
same rule."'
59. 145 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd, 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 824 (1957).
60. 240 F.2d at 687. Accord, Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 128 F. Supp.
457 (D. Md. 1955).
61. 244 F.2d at 684. In a separate concurring opinion Circuit Judge Waterman put
forth the theory that the situs of the seller was determinative of the issues. Since the seller
in this case had a situs in Washington, D.C., the injunction was properly denied. The basis
of this position is that the "place of resale" as used in the McGuire Act should be con-
strued as meaning the place where the seller of the goods is located. While this position
finds some doubtful support in the legislative history of the McGuire Act and in some state
decisions, it would seem that if Congress had intended to make the law of the place where
the seller is located the applicable law it would have been a simple matter to have said so
in precise language and the term "place of resale" would hardly have been used as a
substitute for the term "place where the seller is located." Nevertheless, the New York
Court of Appeals in Raxor Corp. v. Goody, 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802, cert. denied,
348 U.S. 863 (1954), enjoined a seller located in New York from making sales outside the state
below the New York fair trade prices. Certainly the decision would be sound under Judge
Waterman's theory. The difficulty is that the precise rationale of the decision is not very
thoroughly discussed. With the briefest of discussion the court states that the McGuire
Act makes no distinction between goods directly in interstate commerce and those indirectly
in interstate commerce. This is hardly strong authority where the primary issue is the
construction of the McGuire Act in its entirety. It is indicative, however, of the fact that
New York does not consider the place of resale as controlling. It is, however, the intention
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These cases lead to the inescapable conclusion that advertising done or
offers made in fair trade jurisdictions in relation to sales to be made in a
free trade jurisdiction cannot be enjoined simply because such an injunc-
tion is not permitted by the McGuire Act. Thus the McGuire Act re-
quires as the basis of any enforcement action a pricing agreement which
is enforceable by the law of the place of actual or contemplated resale.
Since no such agreement would be enforceable in the District of Columbia
the advertising and offering in relation to sales to be made in that jurisdic-
tion cannot be enjoined regardless of where such advertising or offering
is done.
Finding that the entire issue hinged upon an interpretation of the Mc-
Guire Act, although basically they were construing state statutes, both
courts delved quite deeply into the legislative history of that act.6 2 Par-
ticular stress was laid by the courts upon the rejection of the Keogh Bill63
which would have created a federal cause of action for fair trade viola-
tions and the debates which led to the rejection of the Cole Amendment
to the McGuire Act64 which would have made it an act of unfair com-
petition to deliver pursuant to a sale, or otherwise deliver in a fair trade
jurisdiction any fair trade commodity at less than stipulated price. 65
The practical significance of the General Elec. Co. and Bissell cases
has been marked.66 Representative Harris has been prompted to introduce
a fair trade bill in the House of Representatives.67 The bill creates a
federal cause of action for violation of fair trade agreements with the ex-
ception that the provisions of the act in respect to fair trade agreements,
"... shall not apply to the merchandise of proprietors no substantial part
of whose merchandise crosses state lines at any stage of distribution." "
This leaves the states free to elect whether they will have fair trade as a
state policy in regard to commerce which is primarily intrastate in nature.
of Congress, not the interpretation of New York which is of primary concern when
construing a federal statute such as the McGuire Act.
62. The legislative history of the McGuire Act was most thoroughly examined by the
district court in the Bissell case and was heavily relied upon by the circuit court in affirming
the decision of the district court. Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co.,
140 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 240 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1957). See also Note, 43
Geo. L.J. 258 (1955).
63. H.R. Rep. No. 6925, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
64. 98 Cong. Rec. 4921 (1952).
65. Id. at 4952.
66. General Elec. Co. and Sunbeam Corp. abandoned fair trade in respect to a great
many of their smaller appliances. New York Times, Feb. 27, 1958, p. 1, cols. 7-8. Many
other manufacturers are expected to follow suit.
67. H.R. 10527, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Some insight into the background and
intent of this bill may be had by reference to MacLachlan, A New Approach to Resale
Price Maintenance, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 145 (1957).
68. H.R. 10527, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(7) (1958).
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It is doubtful whether this bill will receive a more congenial welcome
than that extended to the Keogh Bill and the Cole Amendment.69 The
bill attempts to clarify a number of problems which have arisen in fair
trade litigation, such as, for example, adequate notice to nonsigners and
the problem of the proprietor who distributes both through subsidiaries
and through independent distributors.
With regard to the particular problem involved in the General Elec. Co.
and Bissell cases, the bill, while it retains the language of the McGuire
Act, contains significant additions to that language. If a substantial por-
tion of the merchandise crosses state lines at any stage of distribution the
provisions of the bill shall apply,70 thus allowing a plaintiff to proceed di-
rectly under the federal statute. If the plaintiffs in the General Elec. Co.
and Bissell cases had been able to proceed under the Harris Bill instead
of the New York and Maryland statutes would the result in those cases
have been different? Section 2 (5) of the bill states that the word "com-
merce" means all commerce that may be lawfully regulated by Congress
and further declares that it shall be unlawful for any person with actual
notice of stipulated or minimum resale prices to sell, offer to sell, or ad-
vertise merchandise in "commerce" at a lower price.71 The "commerce"
involved in the General Elec. Co. and Bissell cases was clearly commerce
which Congress could regulate. Thus it appears that under the Harris
Bill the advertising and offering in those cases would be unlawful and
could be enjoined.
The future of fair trade as it exists today may well depend in great
measure upon passage of the Harris Bill or similar legislation. The pend-
ing struggle over such legislation in Congress promises to be an interest-
ing one with far reaching results in the economic system of the nation.
69. See notes 63-64 supra.
70. H.R. 10527, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(7) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
71. Id. at § 2(5).
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